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 Fault and Punishment under 
Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter 
Jamie Cameron 
I. ANTONIO LAMER, THE MOTOR VEHICLE REFERENCE AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Antonio Lamer took the lead, following the arrival of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 in constitutionalizing the substantive 
criminal law. Justice Lamer, who died recently, was a puisne judge from 
1980 to 1990 and chief justice of Canada from 1990 to the end of 1999. 
It is common ground that his enduring contributions to the Charter are 
found in the criminal law jurisprudence, and many point to the Motor 
Vehicle Reference as his most important opinion.2 There, he sidelined 
the Charter’s drafters and granted section 7 a substantive interpretation. 
Not only did the MVR create a relationship between the Charter and the 
substantive criminal law, the decision became a jurisprudential lightning 
rod for debate about review. 
The Court’s decision provoked a negative reaction from skeptics who 
feared that an empowered judiciary might invoke section 7 to substitute 
its policy preferences for those of the legislature. That may be why 
Lamer J. granted the guarantee a substantive interpretation but limited 
review to matters arising in the justice system. The constraints he proposed 
                                                                                                            

 Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank 
Ben Berger for his insightful comments, some of which I was unable to address in the scope of this 
paper. I would also like to thank Ms. Megan McLeese (LL.B. 2009) for assisting me in the research 
for this paper. 
1
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter “MVR”). In my opinion, the MVR was Lamer J.’s most important 
opinion. See also D. Stuart, “Chief Justice Antonio Lamer: An Extraordinary Judicial Record of 
Reform of the Canadian Judicial System” (2000) 5 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 51, at 52 (describing Lamer J. 
as “the judge who has undoubtedly stamped his mark on our criminal justice system in a fashion 
unparalleled in Canadian history”). Stuart listed Lamer J.’s top 12 pronouncements on criminal 
justice issues and stated that the MVR “may well have been his most important and most activist 
judgment”. Ibid. 
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were designed to assuage those who were apprehensive that the Court 
would engage in unbounded review under section 7. 
There is much to commend in Lamer J.’s conception of the guarantee. 
A focus on the justice system played to section 7’s status as the flagship 
in the Charter’s fleet of legal rights.3 Those who advocate the rights of 
the accused had little difficulty with the Court’s conclusion in the MVR4 
that, when combined, absolute liability and imprisonment violate the 
Charter. In saying so, the MVR invoked the Court’s iconic decision in  
R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City)5 and did not appear — on its face — to 
bring the judiciary inexorably into clash with the legislative branches. 
For those less concerned with the criminal law, what mattered was the 
MVR’s declaration that policy questions were strictly out of bounds for 
review under section 7. 
Having realized that his decision was open to challenge, Lamer J. 
maintained that as long as section 7’s content was stolidly fixed in the 
institutions of the justice system, review would not break the legitimacy 
barrier and stray into the forbidden realm of public policy. This claim 
depended, for its soundness, on two assumptions. First, Lamer J. claimed 
that the Court could circumvent the substance-procedure distinction by 
relying, instead, on a dichotomy between justice and policy. As presented, 
this dichotomy simply described the conventional hegemony of institutional 
roles: the courts would address questions of justice and the legislatures 
would remain solely responsible for policy choices. Second, Lamer J. 
assumed that his reading of the guarantee would limit review to the 
institutions of the justice system. Under the keen sense of institutional 
mandate he outlined in the MVR,6 review would not, and could not, be 
co-opted. 
It did not take long for Justice Lamer’s concept of section 7 to break 
down. The MVR’s7 foundational distinction between justice and policy 
dissolved when the Court realized that it was impossible to constitutionalize 
the criminal law without undercutting Parliament’s policy choices. A 
trio of decisions which addressed the fault element — the MVR, R. v. 
                                                                                                            
3
 Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
4
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
5
 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sault Ste. Marie”]. 
6
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
7
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
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Vaillancourt,8 and R. v. Martineau9 — energized the section 7 
jurisprudence but failed to generate enduring momentum to reform the 
criminal law. Beyond these landmarks, the Court applied the Charter in 
only two other substantive instances: R. v. Daviault10 and R. v. Ruzic.11  
If anything, the early decisions which endorsed a minimum mens rea 
convinced the Court to go no further with the constitutionalization of fault. 
In due course it also became difficult to defend a theory of review 
that made the criminal law a favourite of the Charter. At least to some, it 
was not credible for the MVR12 to target injustices in the legal system 
and to exclude all other forms of injustice from section 7. Against the 
force of that view, Lamer J. struggled in vain to forestall a broader 
interpretation from taking root in the jurisprudence.13 Once the entitlements 
clause drifted away from a narrow definition — one grounded in physical 
liberty, or a “corporeal” concept of the person, as he described it14 —  
the Court became unwilling to restrict section 7’s application to the 
administration of justice. 
By the time Lamer C.J.C. retired at the end of 1999, the Court had 
all but abandoned the core of his centrepiece decision. Within the justice 
system, the constitutionalization of the substantive criminal law was — 
and to this day remains — stymied.15 Not only that, the Court has 
                                                                                                            
8
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
9
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
10
 [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.). 
11
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.). Although the Court invalidated 
Parliament’s scheme for therapeutic abortions in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988]  
1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.), only Wilson J., writing alone, adopted a substantive interpretation of the 
guarantee. See also R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.) 
(invalidating the former s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code, which had been replaced before the case 
was heard); R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (invalidating a bail 
provision on vagueness grounds, under s. 7, rather than under s. 11(e), which guarantees the right 
not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause); and R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) (recognizing a right to remain silent under s. 7). 
12
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
13
 See Wilson J.’s concurring opinion in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988]  
1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) (proposing a broad and generous definition of liberty of the person under s. 7). 
14
 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 
1 S.C.R. 315, at 346-47 [hereinafter “CAS”]. 
15
 But see R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.) (invalidating 
elements of the definition of duress in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). See also R. v. 
Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (declining to grant a defence of necessity 
or grant a s. 12 claim); R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) 
(refusing to endorse the harm principle and constitutionalize elements of the actus reus); Canadian 
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
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undertaken what the MVR16 forbade, and recognized claims arising outside 
the administration of justice.17 Even though Antonio Lamer could not 
mobilize enduring support for his conception of section 7, his opinions 
created a strong relationship between the Charter and the substantive 
criminal law. For that reason, exploring his criminal law legacy is  an 
important backdrop, but not the main purpose of this paper. Examining 
the interaction between the Charter and the substantive criminal law 
under section 7 is its more pressing objective. Specifically, the question is 
whether the MVR’s18 decision to grant section 7 a substantive interpretation 
can still be defended. 
Despite the seemingly innocuous circumstances of the MVR,19 the 
decision to grant the guarantee a substantive interpretation flushed diverse 
views about the boundaries of review into the open.20 More than 20 
years later there is little agreement, both inside the Court and among 
commentators, about section 7’s purposes. This may explain, in part, 
why the jurisprudence has become such an unwholesome jumble of tests 
and doctrines.21 Meanwhile, some have not forgotten the intent of the 
drafters, which would restrict the guarantee to questions of procedure.22 
                                                                                                            
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) (concluding that s. 43 of the Criminal Code does not violate s. 7’s 
principles of fundamental justice). 
16
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
17
 See Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) 
(invalidating a residence requirement, as a condition of employment, per La Forest J.’s plurality 
opinion, under s. 7 of the Charter); Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. W. (K.L.), [2007] S.C.J. 
No. 48, [2000] 2. S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) (adjudicating a s. 7 claim not arising in the administration of 
justice); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) 
(endorsing an entitlement to welfare benefits under s. 7, per Arbour J. in dissent); and Chaoulli v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (invalidating a 
health care regulation which lacked any connection to the administration of justice, in a plurality 
opinion by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., under s. 7 of the Charter). 
18
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
19
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
20
 For an early criticism of the decision, see J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and 
the Relevance of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987), at 69. 
21
 See J. Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken and the 
Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (tracing the history of the jurisprudence and 
analyzing the Court’s serial and overlapping approaches to s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice). 
22
 See M. Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 183 and S. Choudhry, “The 
Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) Int’l. J. Const. Law 1, at 16-27 
(discussing the dynamics which surrounded the drafting of s. 7). 
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Even among those who favour a substantive interpretation, there is little 
consensus on the scope and content of the guarantee. Though Lamer J.’s 
focus on the justice system has supporters, others propose a mandate for 
section 7 which would empower the Court to enforce social and economic 
entitlements, and to impose positive obligations on the government. At 
the moment, section 7’s future is desperately unclear. 
On other issues the Supreme Court has recently indicated that it is 
prepared to consider the Charter’s early landmarks23 and to resolve 
unsettled questions.24 The next section follows that lead and explains 
why section 7 is ripe for reconsideration. After analyzing the guarantee’s 
journey, it concludes that the Court should not have granted this provision 
a substantive interpretation in the MVR.25 In light of that view, the 
discussion presents an argument that section 7 should return to its 
prelapsarian state — one which rejects substantive review and re-trains 
the guarantee’s attention on procedural issues. More than 20 years after 
a substantive interpretation has been accepted and conceded, this suggestion 
is not lightly or easily made. Any decision not to follow the MVR would 
eliminate review of social and economic policies and potentially leave 
defects in the substantive criminal law without a remedy. A proposal 
which will surely encounter resistance can be defended on two grounds. 
The first is that what is lost in the way of Charter protection will be 
more than offset by what is gained: a return to principle in constitutional 
interpretation. Second, the consequences for the substantive law need 
not be so draconian. In suggesting that the MVR now be abandoned, the 
paper proposes an alternative to section 7, in the case of the substantive 
criminal law, and that is section 12’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment. 
Up to now, a small number of decisions have given this guarantee 
an inhibited interpretation which has obscured its potential.26 For reasons 
                                                                                                            
23
 See Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) (overruling the Court’s landmark decisions 
excluding collective bargaining and the right to strike from s. 2(d) , and adopting a broader 
interpretation of the guarantee which constitutionalizes the process of collective bargaining in the 
public sector).  
24
 See R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) (concluding, after a long 
period of uncertainty, that constitutional exemptions are an unprincipled form of relief and 
unavailable for that reason). 
25
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
26
 A short list, for purposes of this paper, includes decisions which address the constitutionality 
of the sentence: R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.); R. v. Luxton, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.); R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 
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relating to its text and history, section 12 has made no more than a 
modest contribution to the jurisprudence of the Charter and criminal 
justice.27 Though claims rarely succeed, this paper does not challenge the 
“disproportionality” principle or advance doctrinal reforms which would 
provide relief from sentences which are impermissibly harsh. Rather, 
the discussion focuses on the link between the Court’s section 7 and 
section 12 jurisprudence, and concludes that the decisions under these 
guarantees essentially addressed the same issue: the relationship between 
fault and punishment. Under section 7, the Court found that offences 
which attenuated the mental element were unconstitutional when the 
punishment was disproportionate to fault. Meantime, the section 12 
jurisprudence confirms that punishment cannot be imposed in the absence 
of fault, when to do so would offend the principle of proportionality. 
This common bond suggests that a substantive interpretation of section 
7 may not be the only check on the attenuation of fault. The final section 
of the paper pursues that logic by presenting an argument that section 12 
can fill the gap which would arise should the Court reinstate a procedural 
interpretation of section 7. Review on policy matters would not be avoided, 
but would be focused and narrowed in ways that are not possible under the 
MVR.28 This solution would preserve the integrity of the MVR’s concern 
about the relationship between fault and punishment, and eliminate the 
kind of substantive review under section 7 which brought the courts too 
frontally into “the realm of general public policy”.29 
                                                                                                            
485 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 
6 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Arkell, [1990] S.C.J. No. 86, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.) (upholding the 
first degree murder provision in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, under s. 7 of the 
Charter); R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.) (confirming that 
imprisonment without fault violates s. 7); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, 
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.), and Reference re Ng Extradition (Canada), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, 
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.) (considering the constitutionality of extradition to face the death 
sentence). 
27
 For background see W. Tarnopolsky, “Just Deserts or Cruel and Unusual Treatment or 
Punishment? Where Do We Look for Guidance?” (1978) 10 Ottawa Law Rev. 1; and S. Berger, 
“The Application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause under the Canadian Bill of Rights” 
(1978) 24 McGill L.J. 161 (discussing the predecessor provision in the Canadian Bill of Rights, 
R.S.C. 1985, App. III). 
28
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
29
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.). 
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II. THE MVR PARADOX: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
Justice Lamer attempted to circumvent the legitimacy deficit in the 
MVR30 by proposing a hybrid which granted section 7 a substantive 
interpretation and limited its scope to the institutions of justice. In doing so, 
he claimed that substantive review could be undertaken, without adverse 
institutional consequences, as long as it was confined to matters within the 
justice system. His opinion in the MVR offered a contextual interpretation 
to dampen the argument that the intent of the drafters should govern.31 
Specifically, Lamer J. reasoned that section 7’s status as the flagship of 
the Charter’s legal rights made it unacceptable for that guarantee to have 
narrower scope — through a purely procedural interpretation — than the 
discrete entitlements protected by sections 8 to 14.32 
Due to the prospect of imprisonment, section 7’s entitlements did 
not require interpretation in the MVR.33 That enabled Lamer J. to focus 
on the fundamental justice clause and to suggest textual support, in its 
reference to justice, for his justice-policy distinction. That is how he 
rejected the nomenclature of substance and procedure in favour of a 
functional division of authority between policy, which is a legislative 
prerogative, and justice, which is the domain of the courts. The judiciary 
would be estopped from addressing policy questions falling outside the 
institutions of justice under Lamer J.’s reading of the guarantee, which 
did not allow it. The MVR’s answer to concerns about the legitimacy of 
a substantive interpretation was as simple and conclusive as that.34 
                                                                                                            
30
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
31
 More pointedly, he stated that “[i]f the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter 
is to have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that 
historical materials [such as the evidence of intent] do not stunt its growth”. Reference re s. 94(2) of 
the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 509 (S.C.C.). 
32
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 502 (S.C.C.) (stating that “[i]t would be incongruous to interpret s. 7 more 
narrowly than the rights in ss. 8 to 14”; the alternative, “which is to interpret all of ss. 8 to 14 in a 
‘narrow and technical’ manner for the sake of congruity, is out of the question”). 
33
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
34
 Justice Lamer was adamant that his concept of substantive review was strictly institutional, 
and this is how he explained review under s. 7: “[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be 
found in the basic tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public policy 
but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system”: Reference re s. 94(2) 
of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.) 
(emphasis added).  
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This strategy fit the circumstances of section 94(2)’s absolute liability 
provision and, with the Court’s reliance on Sault Ste. Marie,35 provided 
reassurance that the MVR36 respected the time-honoured pattern of 
common law decision-making, albeit under the Charter’s mandate of 
constitutionally entrenched rights. If the MVR’s decision to invalidate a 
provincial driving offence was relatively uncontroversial, the Court’s  
interpretation of the Charter was less straightforward. Whether section 7 
would have force exclusively in the criminal justice system, as Lamer J. 
hinted but did not unequivocally declare, was unknown. 
The jurisprudence which followed the MVR37 and constitutionalized 
the mens rea revealed that the distinction between justice and policy was 
bogus, and that the elements of a criminal offence unavoidably engage 
policy considerations. The shattering of that distinction essentially brought 
the constitutional reform of the criminal law to a halt. Two features of this 
history are critical to the paper’s purposes. First, the relationship between 
fault and punishment was a key variable in the mens rea decisions. That 
variable — which took the form of a proportionality principle — created 
a connection between the section 7 and section 12 jurisprudence. Second, 
as the Court distanced itself from criminal law policy, it paradoxically 
become more responsive to a broader conception of the guarantee which, 
in rejecting the MVR’s constraints on review, brought the Court into 
contact with policy outside the justice system. 
1. The Fallibility of the Justice-Policy Constraint 
After the MVR,38 the Court took steps to constitutionalize the fault 
element before realizing that imposing a minimum mens rea brought the 
judiciary directly into the realm of criminal law policy. Before that 
realization dawned, Lamer J. described the Court’s mandate to monitor 
and review the substantive criminal law in bold, confident terms. In R. v. 
Vaillancourt,39 he declared that while Parliament “retains the power to 
define the elements of a crime”, the courts have the jurisdiction and 
                                                                                                            
35
 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.). 
36
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
37
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
38
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
39
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
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“more important, the duty … to review that definition to ensure that it is 
in accordance with principles of fundamental justice”.40 R. v. Martineau 
added the “unassailable proposition” that Parliament had “directed” the 
Court to review its definitions of the elements of a crime for compliance 
with the Charter, and warned that the judges would be “remiss not to 
heed this command of Parliament”.41 By Lamer J.’s account, the Charter 
had granted the courts a power to review the criminal law which was 
near plenary in scope. 
On its face, the MVR42 held only that the Charter does not permit 
imprisonment without fault. At a broader level of principle, Lamer J.’s 
opinion gave constitutional gravitas to a “generally held revulsion against 
punishment of the morally innocent”.43 He emphasized that “[i]t has 
from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that the innocent 
not be punished”.44 From that vantage section 94(2) was unconstitutional 
because it had “the potential to convict a person who has not really done 
anything wrong”.45 It offended fundamental justice that wholly innocent 
individuals could be imprisoned under the legislation. 
Parliament’s second degree, felony murder scheme did not threaten 
to punish the innocent but provided, instead, that those who cause death 
in the commission of prescribed felonies can be prosecuted for murder. 
In other words, the mens rea to commit a felony was sufficient to ground 
a conviction for murder under section 213 of the Criminal Code.46 In  
R. v. Vaillancourt47 and R. v. Martineau48 the Court considered whether 
the failure to include a fault element for causing death violated section 7’s 
principles of fundamental justice. 
                                                                                                            
40
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 652 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). Despite 
the bravado, and perhaps because he could not command support for that view, he decided the case on 
the more compelling ground that s. 213(d) did not require objective mens rea of the consequences 
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under that provision.  
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 643 (S.C.C.). 
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 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
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 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 514 (S.C.C.) (citing Dickson J.’s opinion in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 
S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.)). 
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 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 513 (S.C.C.). 
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 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486, at 492 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
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 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
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 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
48
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
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That is how the MVR’s49 principle of no imprisonment without fault 
took the form of a constitutional minimum for mens rea. In R. v. 
Vaillancourt50 the Court invalidated the weapons subsection of the Criminal 
Code51 provision for felony murder because an individual could be 
convicted and punished for second degree murder, even though death 
was neither subjectively nor objectively foreseeable.52 Though the mens 
rea to commit the felony was an element of the offence, a fault element 
for causing death — which is what made section 213(d) a murder offence 
— had been eliminated. 
Justice Lamer proposed that, in certain cases, a “special mental 
element” is a prerequisite to conviction. As he explained, this element 
ensures that the accused is morally blameworthy in relation to the 
consequences for which he is being punished. Thus it would be unfair, 
under section 7’s principles of fundamental justice, for section 213(d) to 
stigmatize and punish a person, who is no more than a felon, as a 
murderer. In other words, there is a constitutional level or threshold of 
moral blameworthiness which must be reached to warrant the stigma 
and sentence that attach to convictions for particular crimes. This reasoning 
led the Court to conclude in Vaillancourt that the stigma and sentence 
attaching to murder generated a constitutional minimum which required 
fault in relation to the death element of the actus reus.53 
Justice Lamer clearly stated his preference for a constitutional 
requirement of subjective fault, but could only attain majority support 
for a standard of objective fault.54 Though section 213’s failure to require 
objective fault meant that R. v. Martineau could have been decided the 
same way, Lamer J. chose to set a more exacting requirement of symmetry 
                                                                                                            
49
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
50
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
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 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
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 At the time, s. 213(d) made it culpable homicide, punishable as second degree murder, 
for a person to cause a death in the course of committing certain specified felonies, when a person 
used a weapon or had it on his or her person, and death ensued as a consequence: Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(d). 
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 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 654 (S.C.C.) 
(concluding that it is a principle of fundamental justice that “absent proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of at least objective foreseeability, there surely cannot be a murder conviction”). 
54
 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 654 (S.C.C.) (stating 
his view that a murder conviction cannot rest on anything less than subjective foresight but concluding, 
for purposes of decision, that s. 213(d) did not even meet the lower threshold of objective 
foreseeability). 
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between the actus reus and mens rea.55 Not only did he conclude that the 
Charter requires subjective foresight of death, he stated that the fault 
requirement follows from the “general principle that criminal liability 
for a particular result is not justified except where the actor possesses a 
culpable mental state in respect of that result”.56 The Court did not need 
to comment further in Martineau on the implications of a subjective 
fault requirement under section 7 of the Charter; it was readily apparent 
that a baseline of that kind could deny Parliament the authority to 
criminalize acts which cause unintended consequences. 
Vaillancourt57 and Martineau58 raised the spectre of radical reforms 
to the substantive criminal law, but introduced the variables that enabled 
the Court to contain the concept of a minimum mens rea. Justice Lamer 
explained, in both decisions, that the stigma and sentence for second 
degree murder create a disproportionality between the mens rea of the 
offence and the punishment imposed. The felony murder provisions 
were unconstitutional because the mens rea was too attenuated to 
support Parliament’s mandatory minimum for second degree murder. 
Justice Lamer maintained that subjective foresight of death must be proved 
before an individual can be “labelled and punished” as a murderer, because 
the “punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of 
the offender.”59 As will be seen below, this concept of proportionality 
brought the jurisprudence into contact with the standard that was emerging 
under section 12; it also enabled the Court to avoid the consequences of 
Martineau in the subsequent cases. For the time being, it was unclear 
where the Court’s constitutionalization of fault might lead. Under Lamer 
J.’s reading of the MVR,60 section 7’s principles of fundamental justice 
were concerned not only with the absence of a fault element, but with its 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). At stake in this case was s. 213(a), 
which made second degree murder available as a charge when a person committed any one of 
certain specified felonies, intended to cause bodily harm, and the act resulted in death: Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(a). 
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 645 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
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 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
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 In particular, he stated that “[t]he effect of s. 213 is to violate the principle that 
punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender”, R. v. Martineau, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 645 (S.C.C.); he also declared that “a special mental 
element with respect to death is necessary before a culpable homicide can be treated as murder” and 
that “special mental element gives rise to the moral blameworthiness that justifies the stigma and 
punishment attaching to a murder conviction” (at 646). 
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 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
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sufficiency as well. Following Martineau, it seemed as though the Court 
was poised to impose its view of moral blame on the criminal law.61 
Meanwhile, dissenting opinions in both cases exposed the seamlessness 
of any distinction between justice and policy. In Vaillancourt McIntyre J. 
wrote that defining offences and setting punishment are matters of policy 
which belong to the legislatures, not the courts. Though an unintentional 
death might not be thought of as murder, Parliament was entitled to take  
a harsh approach to felony murder.62 Martineau63 also provoked a dissent 
by L’Heureux-Dubé J., who emphasized that fault and punishment are 
policy matters which, under the MVR’s64 own logic, should rest with 
Parliament.65 She complained that it is not the Court’s job to second-guess 
Parliament’s policy choices in this area, and pointed out that a conviction 
under section 213(a) of the Criminal Code66 required a high degree of 
moral blame.67 
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 See J. Stribopoulos, “The Constitutionalization of ‘Fault’ in Canada: A Normative Critique” 
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(dissenting opinion). 
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
64
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
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 As she explained: 
Policy considerations in Canada as well as in other jurisdictions have inspired legislation 
that considers objective foreseeability sufficient as the minimum mens rea requirement for 
murder....  
Striking down the legislation simply because some other scheme may be preferable 
would be an unwarranted intrusion into Parliament’s prerogative …The Charter does not 
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R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 681 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). 
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 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 664 (S.C.C.) (detailing 
five respects in which a person must be found blameworthy before a conviction can be entered 
under this section). She also discounted the factor of stigma in determining the constitutionality of 
an offence (at 678-79). See also R. Cairns-Way, “Constitutionalizing Subjectivism: Another View” 
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a variable in determining the constitutionality of criminal offences). 
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In suggesting that the symmetry principle might demand subjective 
foresight of consequences, Martineau68 had the potential to subvert a 
variety of Criminal Code69 provisions. After flirting with a minimum 
mens rea, the Court balked when that requirement threatened to supplant 
Parliament’s conception of criminal responsibility. Paradoxically, Lamer J.’s 
principle of proportionality spared the Court from interfering with 
Parliament’s authority to decide what conduct is punishable. 
Second degree murder fit the circumstances of a proportionality 
principle because conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 
life imprisonment.70 In the cases which followed Martineau,71 the Court 
realized that section 7’s requirement of proportionality could be met — 
despite the lack of symmetry between the actus reus and mens rea — 
whenever the sentence was a matter of discretion. Individualized sentencing 
meant that there was no gap between the constitutional requirement of 
fault and the punishment which would be imposed. That reasoning not 
only brought the section 7 analysis closer to the underlying concepts of 
section 12, but in doing so effectively re-interpreted Vaillancourt72 and 
Martineau as cases which required a minimum mens rea because the 
consequences of a murder conviction were uniquely so severe. 
The limits of section 7’s minimum mens rea were tested in several 
cases which were decided in the early 1990s. Among them are two which 
stand out as tipping points for the constitutionalization of fault: R. v. 
DeSousa73 and R. v. Creighton.74 Both times, the Court rejected the 
concept of a threshold for fault under section 7 and in doing so handily 
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
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 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
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 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
72
 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
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 [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.). 
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 [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Tutton, [1989] S.C.J. 
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under the Competition Act [Combines Investigation Act], R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23); R. v. Nova Scotia 
Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.) (declining to specify a 
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found that the principle of proportionality was satisfied. Assuming no 
imprisonment without fault, Creighton made it clear that, short of a 
mandatory minimum, no sentence or stigma would fail the Vaillancourt-
Martineau standard. The decision also made it plain that the Court had 
little further interest in monitoring Parliament’s definitions of crime. 
The unanswered question in Martineau75 was whether section 7 permits 
Parliament to punish an individual for causing unintended consequences. 
Any number of offences which attach additional penalties to conduct that 
causes specified consequences were at risk of being invalidated under this 
view of the guarantee’s reach.76 In that context, the Court’s conclusion 
in DeSousa,77 that the Charter does not require that degree of symmetry 
between fault and punishment, was pivotal. There, Sopinka J. stated, 
unambiguously, that once the mens rea for a predicate offence is satisfied, 
section 7 requires no more than objective foresight of the prohibited 
consequences. Specifically, he found that section 269’s offence of 
unlawfully causing bodily harm does not require subjective foresight of 
the prohibited consequence. 
Whether by way of clarifying Martineau78 or in retreating from it, 
Sopinka J. stated that providing there is “a sufficiently blameworthy 
element in the actus reus to which a culpable mental state is attached”, 
the Charter does not require a symmetrical fault element for every 
aspect of an unlawful act, including its consequences.79 To impose such 
a demand, he remarked, would “substantially restructure current notions 
of criminal responsibility”.80 With those words, the Court acknowledged 
the impact section 7 could have on the substantive criminal law, and 
signalled its unwillingness to entertain challenges to a family of offences 
which penalize unintended consequences. 
Rather than further the concept of a constitutional minimum, the Court 
deferred to Parliament’s judgment that those who engage in unlawful 
conduct should be punished for the unintended consequences of their 
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action.81 As Sopinka J. explained, “[n]either basic principles of criminal 
law, nor the dictates of fundamental justice require, by necessity, intention 
in relation to the consequences of an otherwise blameworthy act.”82 
Martineau83 may have required subjective fault for a second degree murder 
conviction, but section 269 was not the same. There, the commission of 
a predicate offence was sufficiently blameworthy to hold the accused 
responsible when his unlawful act resulted in bodily harm. DeSousa’s84 
conclusion that a lesser and non-symmetrical degree of fault would 
satisfy section 7’s standard of fundamental justice put brackets around 
Vaillancourt85 and Martineau as decisions which rested on the 
constitutionally lethal combination of felony murder and a mandatory 
minimum sentence of life imprisonment.86 By contrast, there was nothing 
significant about the stigma of a section 269 conviction. More to the 
point, DeSousa demonstrated that few offences would fail proportionality’s 
standard for punishment where sentencing was at the discretion of the 
trial court.87 
The principle of a minimum mens rea stalled indefinitely when the 
Court held, in R. v. Creighton, that section 7 does not require a fault 
element for death in the case of unlawful act manslaughter.88 Creighton 
achieved a degree of resolution after the Court had fussed, in a series of 
decisions, over the relationship between the Charter and the criminal 
law.89 There, La Forest J. waffled between the two plurality opinions 
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before joining McLachlin J. and denying Lamer C.J.C. a majority. 
Justice McLachlin’s opinion rejected the proposition that symmetry is a 
principle of fundamental justice,90 and held that objective foresight of 
bodily harm suffices, for purposes of the Charter, in manslaughter cases. 
Justice McLachlin also invoked the Court’s markers of stigma and 
punishment to dispose of the proportionality issue; the felony murder 
rule was an example of disproportionality, but unlawful act manslaughter 
was not.91 
Critically, Lamer C.J.C. was unable to command majority support 
for the view that symmetry required objective foresight of death. Not 
only had the Court retreated from a concept of subjective fault, it had 
further diluted the symmetry principle by upholding a homicide conviction 
without a mens rea requirement for death. If section 7 did not require 
symmetry for a homicide offence, it was unclear when it would ever be 
required. In this way the constitutionalization of mens rea effectively 
ended with Creighton and its companion cases.92 Commentators saw 
wholesale retreat, if not an about-face, in the post-Martineau decisions.93 
Once the Court refused to develop its fledgling concept of minimum 
fault, the Charter’s impact on the substantive law would be relegated to 
occasional and episodic interventions. Though the defence of intoxication 
was constitutionalized under section 7, the ensuing brouhaha showed the 
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Court that it entered the policy fray at its own peril.94 And despite 
tinkering with the Criminal Code’s95 definition of duress, the Court has 
since declined to constitutionalize other elements of the offence or to 
subject the substantive law to Charter scrutiny in other contexts.96 To 
this day, it is a matter of disappointment to some that the MVR’s97 promise 
remains largely unfulfilled. 
Despite expansive statements in Vaillancourt98 and Martineau99 
about the Court’s mandate under section 7, the constitutionalization of 
mens rea was no more than a modest success. In principle, there were 
two fundamental problems with the MVR’s100 “constitutional aversion” 
to offences which might punish the morally innocent. First, the Court 
pushed the boundaries of review by pronouncing on the constitutionality 
of Parliament’s concept of moral blame. Inasmuch as the MVR claimed 
that the Court would not tread on policy, that is exactly what happened 
in Vaillancourt and Martineau. A second problem was that there were 
no obvious or identifiable limits on the concept of minimum mens rea. 
A symmetrical requirement of fault for every act or consequence that 
Parliament made punishable would run judicial interference on a concept 
of criminal responsibility that was deeply entrenched in the Criminal 
Code.101 By the time R. v. DeSousa102 was decided, the Court had 
realized that such an interpretation of section 7 would take review to 
places it could not legitimately go. 
Even so, the MVR,103 Vaillancourt104 and Martineau105 established a 
constitutional minimum for offences which impermissibly attenuated the 
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mental element. Without per se addressing the question of punishment, 
the Court found the provisions unconstitutional because the sentence 
which could or would be imposed in each of these cases was fundamentally 
unjust: it carried a sentence which, in diluting the fault element, violated 
the principle that the punishment and blameworthiness of the accused 
must be proportional. In this, Lamer J. took the lead in developing the 
Court’s section 7 jurisprudence, as he also did in the section 12 decisions 
— which may be one reason why the analysis under both guarantees 
bears a close resemblance. After discussing section 7’s journey outside 
the criminal justice system, the paper discusses the relationship between 
fault and punishment under section 12. 
Justice Lamer proposed a conception of section 7 that did not work 
well in the setting of the criminal justice system. But nor was the Court 
able to withstand the pressure to expand the guarantee beyond the 
boundaries of criminal justice. The MVR’s106 theory of review began to 
buckle, almost from the start, because other members of the Court did 
not accept Lamer J.’s compromise between an all-or-nothing approach to 
substantive review. Over his objections, the Court granted the guarantee’s 
entitlements a more generous interpretation. Decisions which entertained 
claims at large and without connection to the justice system directly 
contradicted the MVR and undermined its fundamental assumptions. 
Justice Lamer’s warning that the Court should not engage in substantive 
review of legislative policy outside the administration of justice was 
ignored. In rejecting his conception of the guarantee, this jurisprudence 
challenged the foundation for review that had been laid in the MVR. 
2. Letting the Institutional Constraint Go 
The dichotomy of justice and policy was initally eroded, outside the 
mens rea context, by R. v. Morgentaler.107 There, the Court invalidated 
the Criminal Code’s108 framework for therapeutic abortions, claimed that 
the scheme was procedurally unjust, and declined to address a woman’s 
substantive right to seek an abortion. Reviving the substance-procedure 
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distinction which had been spurned in the MVR109 did not alter the fact 
that the Court had invalidated Parliament’s abortion policy. In doing so, 
Dickson C.J.C. proposed a “manifest unfairness” test110 which subsequently 
took the form, in the dissenting opinion of McLachlin J., as she then 
was, in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),111 of a section 
7 prohibition on arbitrary laws. Morgentaler and Rodriguez, which 
upheld the Code’s assisted suicide provision, both satisfied the MVR’s 
administration of justice criterion; both likewise arose in a criminal 
setting. At the same time, both cases invited the Court to disagree with 
Parliament’s decision to criminalize certain conduct. As well, the claim 
in each rested on a broader concept of entitlement than mere physical 
liberty, or freedom from the physical restraint of imprisonment. In 
Morgentaler, the Court focused on security of the person to avoid 
commenting on the guarantee’s liberty entitlement, and Rodriguez likewise 
relied on security, rather than liberty of the person. Writing alone in 
Morgentaler, Wilson J. proposed a broad-ranging definition of liberty 
which recognized a woman’s right to seek an abortion under section 7 of 
the Charter.112 In doing so she placed upward pressure on section 7’s 
entitlements by expanding liberty of the person to embrace a right to 
make fundamental personal choices, including the right to have an abortion, 
free from state interference.113 
These and other decisions show how the MVR’s114 institutional 
concept of substantive review faltered when the Court began to interpret 
section 7’s entitlements clause. The mens rea jurisprudence did not 
                                                                                                            
109
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
110
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 72 (S.C.C.).  
111
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). This principle later became a source 
of deep division within the Court in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). 
112
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 166 (S.C.C.) (maintaining 
that s. 7’s “liberty”, properly construed, grants the individual “a degree of autonomy in making 
decisions of fundamental personal importance”). A version of Wilson J.’s definition was adopted 
by the Court, some years later, in Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.). 
113
 The entitlement in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 
94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 589 (S.C.C.) followed the majority approach in R. v. Morgentaler, 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) and focused on security of the person rather than 
liberty of the person (concluding that the prohibition in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46  
on assisted suicide deprived Rodriguez of autonomy of person and caused her physical and 
psychological stress in a way that impinged her security of the person). 
114
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
572 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
engage that part of the guarantee, because imprisonment per se violates 
liberty of the person. It would not take Lamer J. long to see that the 
MVR’s institutional concept of review would not work unless definitional 
restrictions were placed on section 7’s primary entitlements. In declining 
to comment further on liberty or to consider the meaning of security of 
the person, he had deliberately reserved the point in the MVR.115 Though 
the attempt would be futile, Lamer J. later wrote two concurring opinions 
which fiercely defended a conception of liberty that would shackle its 
content to the coercive purposes of the criminal law. 
Despite also arising under the Criminal Code,116 the Solicitation 
Reference placed the scope of entitlement in issue.117 The question there 
was whether a prohibition on solicitation infringed a prostitute’s liberty 
to pursue a profession of choice or her security of interest in procuring 
the basic necessities of life. The prospect that section 7 might open up to 
economic entitlements provoked a vehement response from Lamer J. To 
his mind, an expansive interpretation of the guarantee’s first clause 
threatened the legitimacy of review. Compliance with the MVR118 and its 
focus on the institutions of justice required a restrictive interpretation of 
liberty: he was adamant that any other approach would entangle the Court 
in institutional transgressions which would compromise the legitimacy 
of review. 
For that reason, his concurrence in the Solicitation Reference119 urged 
rigid adherence to the contours of the MVR.120 He wrote sternly and at 
length in an attempt to thwart efforts to enlarge section 7 beyond a mandate 
that was strictly focused on the justice system. In particular, he urged 
the Court to limit liberty of the person to state interferences with an 
individual’s physical freedom.121 The effect of his position was to read 
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the institutional focus of the fundamental justice clause into the definition 
of entitlement. Limiting both parts of the guarantee to matters arising in 
the administration of justice was imperative, in his view, to preserve that 
critical distinction between justice and policy.122 
Justice Lamer’s concurrence sounded an alarm and rested on a strained 
approach to the text; unlike section 7’s second clause, the entitlements 
clause contains no language that remotely refers to, much less targets, 
the institutions of justice. Yet he was plainly concerned that the MVR’s123 
constraints on review would be disregarded and that the Court would 
stray into the realm of pure public policy.124 That is why he wrote with 
such urgency to halt any movement toward an expansive interpretation of 
section 7’s entitlements.125 For him, the guarantee’s integrity depended 
on both clauses receiving an interpretation that was consistent with the 
MVR’s theory of review. 
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The second decision in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society126 isolated 
the Chief Justice and, in rejecting a conception of entitlement based on 
freedom from physical liberty, made further inroads on the MVR’s127 
theory of review inevitable. The case considered section 7’s requirements 
when a minor was removed from parents who refused, for religious 
reasons, to allow blood transfusions which were medically necessary. 
Though not a criminal case, CAS arose in the administration of justice. 
Despite agreeing that there was no violation of fundamental justice, 
members of the Court divided on the preliminary question of entitlement. 
In the contest to control the meaning of liberty, La Forest J.’s opinion 
must be seen as pivotal. He openly and unequivocally rejected a 
definition of liberty as “mere freedom from physical restraint”, endorsed 
Wilson J.’s definition from Morgentaler,128 and declared that section 7 
guarantees each individual’s “personal autonomy to live his or her own 
life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance”.129 
He did not win majority support, but attracted four votes for that view of 
the entitlement.130 
Chief Justice Lamer strenuously resisted La Forest J.’s suggestion 
that section 7 protects parental autonomy. He demanded that liberty of 
the person be limited to encounters with the administration of justice 
which place an individual’s physical freedom at risk.131 In doing so he 
insisted on a holistic interpretation of the guarantee which would restrict 
its entitlements to matters connected with the institutional processes of the 
justice system.132 The most revealing parts of Lamer C.J.C.’s concurring 
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opinion expose his fears about the consequences of releasing the guarantee 
from the MVR’s133 constraints. Doing so, he stated, “would not only be 
contrary to the structure of the Charter and of the provision itself, but 
would also be contrary to the scheme, the context and the manifest 
purpose of s. 7”.134 For the Chief Justice, the most serious problem was 
the absence of limits on the guarantee’s scope and the lack of principled 
boundaries on review.135 He fretted that La Forest J.’s definition would 
confer constitutional protection on “all eccentricities expressed by 
members of our society” and “would inevitably lead to a situation where we 
would have government by judges”.136 Ironically, these are the arguments 
he dismissed when he gave section 7 a substantive interpretation for the 
first time in the MVR. 
Justice La Forest continued to batter the MVR137 in Godbout v. 
Longueuil (City), which invalidated a rule that required municipal workers 
to reside in their employer’s city.138 While six members of the Court 
decided the case under the Quebec Charter, three others led by La Forest J. 
held that the condition violated section 7 of the Charter. That view, 
which was supported by L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ., was without 
precedent. Not only did the claim pose a free-standing substantive 
challenge to the municipality’s resolution, which lacked an interaction 
with the justice system, it also asked the Court to enforce an economic 
entitlement. Justice La Forest stated that section 7 must be read “in light 
of the values reflected in the Charter as a whole, and not just those … 
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described as ‘legal rights’”,139 and declared, once again, that liberty protects 
“the right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein  
individuals may make inherently private choices free from state 
interference”.140 This time, and for whatever reason, Lamer C.J.C. chose 
to remain silent and permit La Forest J.’s definition of liberty to stand 
unanswered.141 
The MVR142 claimed that section 7’s substantive content would be 
limited to matters arising in the administration of justice. As the guarantee’s 
interaction with the substantive criminal law tapered, other claims began 
to look more promising. CAS,143 which had considered section 7 in a 
civil setting, was followed by New Brunswick (Minister of Health and 
Community Services) v. G. (J.), which would be one of Lamer C.J.C.’s 
final opinions.144 There he held that the government’s failure to provide 
legal representation to a parent who might lose custody of her children 
in a court hearing violated fundamental justice, because she did not have 
the opportunity to participate effectively in the hearing.145 Though the 
Chief Justice had rejected the proposition in CAS that section 7 protects 
any element of parental liberty unrelated to physical restraint, he avoided 
that constraint in G. (J.) by shifting his attention to security of the person.146 
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The decision was grounded in the administration of justice, but 
expanded section 7 by imposing an affirmative duty on the government 
to fund legal counsel in certain circumstances. From there the jurisprudence 
continued to loosen its connection with the MVR147 in Winnipeg Child 
and Family Services v. W. (K.L.)148 which, like Godbout,149 addressed  
the content of section 7’s principles of fundamental justice in a setting 
entirely outside the administration of justice. Gosselin v. Quebec,150 which 
was decided after Lamer C.J.C. retired, was yet another section 7 turning 
point. There, Arbour J. wrote a dissenting opinion which charted a radical 
path for the guarantee. Daringly, she advocated an interpretation which 
would reach matters of social and economic policy, and claimed that 
affirmative entitlements could be enforced against government under 
this conception of the guarantee.151 Though her view was endorsed only 
by L’Heureux-Dubé J., who was soon to retire, Arbour J. had liberated 
section 7 from the MVR’s taboo on matters of policy. In doing so, she 
validated an entirely different view of entitlement — one which had 
been dreaded for years by some, including the drafters, and advocated, 
at times fervently, by others. 
The MVR’s152 conception of section 7 all but toppled in Chaoulli v. 
Quebec, when a plurality opinion by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. 
held that a provision which prohibited access to private health care 
insurance violated section 7 because it was arbitrary.153 Undeterred by 
the policy content of the law, the judges did not consider it problematic 
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that the section 7 claim was free-standing, and had no connection to the 
justice system. A regulation which was designed to preserve the integrity 
of the public health care system was pure policy, but the plurality opinion 
found that it arbitrarily violated the security rights of those who were 
denied access to medical services as a result. 
Chaoulli’s154 foray into the policy domain contradicted the MVR155 
and provoked controversy. Inside the Court, the Binnie-LeBel plurality 
opinion dissented in the strongest terms from what it regarded as an 
inappropriate intrusion by judges into matters of democratic governance.156 
With the seventh member of the panel providing the determinative vote 
on statutory grounds, the split exposed a fault line inside the Court. On 
one side were judges who were prepared to invalidate legislation falling 
outside the MVR’s institutional theory of review; on the other were 
those who supported its administration of justice constraint.157 Chaoulli 
has been praised some, including by those who advocate a mandate for 
section 7 which would include social and economic entitlements. It has 
also been denounced by those who were skeptical — from the outset — 
of MVR’s promise that review could and would be limited to non-policy 
matters falling within the administration of justice.158 
This history leads to the unavoidable conclusion that section 7 is in 
a state of disarray. The Court has failed to regulate the scope of the 
guarantee or give its parameters conceptual coherence. In responding to 
claims on a case-by-case basis, the Court has developed an array of 
doctrines and tests to manage the question of fundamental justice which 
are unrelated to each other, or to an identifiable concept of the guarantee. 
These dynamics place section 7 at a juncture which requires that a 
choice be made. Reclaiming the conception of review first proposed by 
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Lamer J. in the MVR159 — and rejecting Chaoulli’s160 gesture to broader 
policy questions unrelated to the legal system — is one option. Another 
approach would relax the constraints on section 7 and allow the guarantee 
to address injustices of all kinds, wherever and however they arise. 
Finally, it is not too late to reject a substantive interpretation of section 7 
and return to a prelapsarian concept of the guarantee solely as a source 
of protection against injustices of a procedural nature. 
III. THE WAY FORWARD 
The potentially unrestrained scope of liberty and security of the 
person made it imperative for constraints to be placed on the guarantee’s 
interpretation. Justice Lamer recognized the problem inherent in an 
indeterminate, all-inclusive approach to entitlement under section 7, but 
was unwilling to deny the Charter a role in modifying the criminal law. 
Though restricting the guarantee’s content to matters of procedural 
justice was the constraint the drafters had in mind, the MVR161 rejected 
that option and proposed a form of substantive review which would be 
limited to proceedings arising in the justice system. 
Justice Lamer’s conception of section 7 offered an intermediate 
position between the extremes of all or nothing on substantive review. 
As seen above, he proposed a theory with built-in limits which he 
thought would ensure that the Court did not interfere with pure public 
policy. Yet the attempt to mediate section 7’s content was unsuccessful; 
under his approach the constitutionalization of mens rea went too far 
and the protection of entitlements outside the criminal law did not go far 
enough. The Court’s focus on fault and the symmetry principle placed a 
number of Criminal Code162 offences at risk of being invalidated because 
the Court disagreed with Parliament’s definition of criminal responsibility. 
Constitutionalizing the mens rea quickly brought the Court into conflict 
with Parliament’s policy choices in deciding how criminal offences should 
be defined and punished. 
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Once a substantive interpretation was established, members of the 
Court grew restive under the MVR’s163 constraints. Justice Wilson was 
quick to embrace a broad, substantive definition of liberty, and La Forest J. 
picked up on her initiative in CAS164 and Godbout.165 In each case he 
expressed the view that section 7 must be interpreted in light of all the 
Charter’s values and not limited by its formal classification as a legal 
right. Over time, Lamer J.’s insistence that an institutional constraint be 
read into both of section 7’s clauses lacked traction. Not only did it strain 
credulity to read the guarantee’s entitlements as limited to constraints on 
physical liberty, the claim that the Charter could only address injustices 
arising in the legal system was unconvincing. 
The Court’s decision to abandon the MVR’s166 administration of 
justice constraint was not the answer. An interpretation that empowers 
courts to invalidate social and economic policies which are “unjust” 
violations of liberty or security of the person is problematic. It is 
unsound for the reasons Antonio Lamer gave in the MVR and reinforced 
in the Solicitation Reference167 and CAS.168 It is unsound for the reasons 
identified by the Binnie-LeBel plurality in Chaoulli v. Quebec,169 as well 
as for those offered in Gosselin v. Quebec170 by Justice Bastarache.171 It 
is the same problem that was identified when the MVR was decided, and 
was answered at that time by Lamer J.’s attempt to place definitional 
boundaries around a guarantee which, in terms, was potentially without 
limit. The problem with a concept of section 7 that addresses fundamental 
injustices whenever and wherever they arise is that review under that 
theory of entitlement is indefinite. It is either so broad as to bring the 
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courts routinely into conflict with legislative policy, or so selective in 
the claims it protects as to be arbitrary.172 
Though the MVR’s173 distinction between justice and policy was 
unsound from the start, Lamer J.’s theory of section 7 held a certain 
attraction. By limiting the guarantee’s substantive content to the institutions 
of the justice system, his concept constrained the scope of review. And 
though it was incapable of eliminating the concerns that are inherent in 
giving fundamental justice a substantive interpretation, it confined the 
range in which those concerns would operate. Though it was less than 
persuasive, Lamer J.’s concept of section 7 was strengthened by the 
structural argument that the text of the Charter directs attention to the 
justice system; the guarantee’s placement under the heading of legal rights 
provided further support for the proposition that its content is legal 
rather than social or economic in nature. 
At the same time, the MVR’s174 distinction between the legal system 
and matters of legislative policy failed to explain why section 7 should 
have any substantive content at all. In the end, that may be the fatal flaw 
of Lamer J.’s theory of review: it was not obvious why the text allowed 
a substantive interpretation and then limited that interpretation to the 
criminal law. The suggestion that section 7 should privilege injustices 
arising in the justice system over all others proved unworkable and 
unpersuasive. As the MVR, Morgentaler,175 the second degree murder cases, 
Rodriguez176 and Daviault177 all demonstrate, it is difficult to maintain — 
on principled grounds — that review under a restricted theory of section 7 
is legitimate, or more legitimate, than the alternative of open-ended review. 
The text and history do not support a double standard for section 7’s 
substantive interpretation. 
It is unavoidable that any substantive approach to section 7 is 
problematic, whether limited to the criminal justice system or more 
open in nature. The Court’s inability to articulate a coherent concept of 
                                                                                                            
172
 See J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and the Relevance of American Doctrine in 
Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 69, at 89 
(explaining this dilemma of interpretation). 
173
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
174
 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]  
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). 
175
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). 
176
 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 
(S.C.C.). 
177
 R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.). 
582 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
review — one which would identify the core of the guarantee and explain 
the scope of entitlement — demonstrates that a procedural interpretation 
was not an unwise choice. Yet the most powerful argument against a 
minimalist conception of section 7 is the one which first succeeded in 
the MVR;178 under a procedural interpretation there would be no recourse 
for laws that are substantively unfair. 
From a certain point of view, the consequences of such a proposal 
need not be so draconian. The Court’s section 7 landmarks established 
that the Charter demands a relationship of proportionality between fault 
and punishment. The trilogy — the MVR,179 Vaillancourt180 and 
Martineau181 — invalidated offences which potentially imposed punishment 
that was disproportionate to the accused’s blameworthiness. In the MVR, 
the offence was unconstitutional because it had the potential to send an 
innocent person to jail. The second degree murder provisions were 
invalidated in Vaillancourt and Martineau because mandatory life 
imprisonment was disproportionate in the case of a person who did not 
intend to cause death. Albeit from a different perspective, the Court’s 
decision in R. v. Oakes reflects a similar concern.182 There, the Court 
invalidated a reverse onus clause because it mandated a conviction — 
and punishment — in some circumstances where the accused might have 
been blameless. 
While the section 7 cases examined the severity of the punishment 
to determine the constitutionality of the fault element, the section 12 
decisions considered the role of fault in determining whether certain forms 
of punishment were cruel or unusual. Though articulated in guarantee-
specific language, the section 7 and 12 cases rest, fundamentally, on the 
same analysis. And to the extent that is so, section 12 may offer a viable 
alternative to substantive review under section 7. The next section 
pursues that possibility by considering whether section 12 can fill the 
gap arising from any return to a procedural interpretation of section 7. 
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IV. SECTION 12: THE CHARTER’S “FAINT HOPE” GUARANTEE183 
Section 12, like section 7, had a promising start with the Supreme 
Court’s decision, in R. v. Smith, to invalidate Parliament’s mandatory 
minimum sentence for importing narcotics.184 The Court’s leading opinion 
there, as in the section 7 fault trio, was authored by Lamer J.185 In the 
circumstances of an offender who was caught re-entering the country 
with seven-and-a-half ounces of pure cocaine in his possession, the 
conclusion that section 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act186 violated 
section 12 was extraordinary. The provision was unconstitutional because 
it imposed a minimum of seven years’ imprisonment, without regard to 
the quantity of drug imported, and could apply — quite unfairly — to a 
person driving home from winter break in the United States, with “his or 
her ‘first joint of grass’”.187 Justice Lamer stated that section 12 addresses 
the “quality of the punishment” and “is concerned with the effect that 
the punishment may have on the person on whom it is imposed”.188  
He introduced the concept of proportionality but emphasized that the 
test under section 12 is one of gross disproportionality. Specifically, the 
guarantee would only be infringed, he said, when the sentence is “so 
unfit having regard to the offence and the offender as to be grossly 
disproportionate”.189 
Any expectation that the jurisprudence would blossom after Smith190 
was dashed by a series of decisions which, together, show that the 
Supreme Court regards section 12 as a “faint hope” guarantee of sorts 
— one which is available only on rare occasions and in exceptional 
circumstances.191 Thus far, claims have succeeded, at the Supreme Court 
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level, on only two occasions.192 Instead, the jurisprudence has consistently 
stated that a violation will only be found “on rare and unique occasions”, 
because the test of proportionality “is very properly stringent and 
demanding”.193 A lesser standard, Cory J. warned in Steele v. Mountain 
Institution, “would tend to trivialize the Charter”.194 
As presently understood, section 12’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment has little vitality as a Charter entitlement. 
Rather than require a relationship of proportionality between the offender’s 
conduct and the sentence, the Court has focused on disproportionality 
and placed a heavy burden on the accused to prove that the punishment 
fails that standard.195 Moreover, and instead of considering the 
proportionality between the blameworthiness of an accused’s conduct 
and the punishment imposed, the Court considers whether a sentence is 
defensible in abstract and global terms.196 It has found that generally, 
punishment which is not outrageous, excessive and beyond all standards 
of decency for a diverse and indeterminate class of offenders does not 
violate section 12. 
The Supreme Court’s standard of disproportionality demands re-
examination against the objectives of section 12. This is especially so at 
this point in time, with mandatory minimums in ascendancy. With the 
exception of Smith197 and the second degree, felony murder cases decided 
under section 7, the Court has held that mandatory sentences do not offend 
the Charter.198 That assumption should be challenged by a concept of 
entitlement that focuses on the presence of proportionality, not an absence 
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of disproportionality, and considers whether the punishment imposed is 
excessive in the circumstances of the particular individual who has been 
convicted. Whether and in what circumstances Parliament is entitled to set 
harsh sentences to promote general deterrence, retribution or denunciation 
— at the expense of objectives which relate to the circumstances of the 
accused — should be dealt with under section 1. The purpose of section 
12 should be to identify impermissible gaps between fault and punishment; 
from there, further questions about the justifiability of a mandatory floor 
should be addressed under section 1. There, it is open to the government 
to show why a sentence that is disproportionate under section 12 
nonetheless satisfies section 1’s proportionality test, once Parliament’s 
broader policy objectives in enhancing the penalty or adopting a mandatory 
minimum are taken into account. 
A re-conceptualization of section 12 cannot be undertaken here, and 
nor is this the occasion to address the status of mandatory sentences.199 
This paper’s concern is with the MVR’s200 failure to state a viable concept 
of section 7 and the search for an alternative venue for criminal law 
review under the Charter. From that perspective, its limited objective is 
to demonstrate that, at least where the fault element has been attenuated, 
a substantive interpretation of section 7 may be unnecessary. In this regard, 
it is significant that the punishment was a key variable in the section 7 
jurisprudence which stated a constitutional minimum for mens rea, and 
that fault has been a key variable in the assessment of proportionality 
under section 12. Though the test of breach is strict, the Court’s decisions 
accept, in principle, that punishment which is excessive in relation to fault 
violates the Charter’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
In Luxton, for instance, the Court rejected the claim, which was 
raised under sections 7 and 12, that Parliament’s first degree felony 
murder provision was unconstitutional because it imposed a mandatory 
minimum of 25 years’ life imprisonment.201 Chief Justice Lamer held 
that Parliament was entitled to treat all offenders with equal severity, 
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and without regard to the relative blameworthiness of individuals. 
Specifically, he found that the punishment satisfied proportionality; 
citing Martineau,202 he stated that subjective foresight of death is required 
for every murder conviction, and that the moral blameworthiness of the 
offender is “markedly enhance[d]” where forcible confinement results in 
death.203 The Chief Justice elaborated that “[t]his is a crime that carries 
with it the most serious level of moral blameworthiness, namely subjective 
foresight of death,” and that the penalty accordingly “is severe and 
deservedly so”.204 To summarize, the punishment did not violate section 
12 because subjective mens rea, the highest degree of fault, was required 
for a conviction. 
Other decisions confirm that fault is a key variable in the section 12 
analysis. In R. v. Goltz, Gonthier J. upheld a mandatory sentence of seven 
days’ imprisonment for driving while prohibited.205 The high threshold 
of gross disproportionality was not crossed, he said, because the accused 
“knowingly and contemptuously violated the prohibition”.206 The offender 
was blameworthy in his own right, and reasonable hypotheticals did not 
direct a different disposition. It is also instructive that McLachlin J., as 
she then was, dissented in Goltz, because the mandatory minimum could 
prevent the Court “from reaching a fair result” and “indeed require  
the judge in some cases to impose a sentence which is grossly 
disproportionate”.207 This could occur in situations where a person was 
relatively blameless in driving while prohibited. R. v. Pontes, which 
brought the constitutionality of a driving offence to the Court a third 
time, further embedded the relationship between fault and punishment in 
the jurisprudence.208 The case, which focused on whether the offence 
created an absolute or strict liability offence and was decided under 
section 7, held that the Motor Vehicle Act209 created an absolute liability 
offence and that “no person is liable to imprisonment for an absolute 
liability offence.”210 There was no violation of section 7 because the 
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provision, when read alongside the Offence Act,211 did not place offenders 
at risk of imprisonment. Pontes showed, once again, the symbiosis of 
fault and punishment in the section 7 and 12 jurisprudence. 
Subsequent decisions in R. v. Morrisey212 and R. v. Latimer213 also treat 
moral blameworthiness as an aspect of the disproportionality analysis. 
Morrisey tested the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum of four 
years for negligently causing death in the use of a firearm. In upholding 
the punishment, Gonthier J. repeatedly called attention to the level of 
blameworthiness the offence required and concluded, without difficulty, 
that no matter who the accused is, a floor of four years for this offence 
was not disproportionate. In particular, he stated that “[a]lthough less 
morally blameworthy than murder, criminal negligence causing death is 
still morally culpable behaviour that warrants a response by Parliament 
dictating that wanton or reckless disregard for the life and safety of others 
is simply not acceptable.”214 Justice Arbour dissented, though without 
invalidating the provision, to express her concern that the “inflationary 
floor” might be disproportionate in individual circumstances. Citing 
McLachlin J.’s statement in Creighton,215 that “the sentence can be and 
is tailored [in manslaughter cases] to suit the degree of moral fault of the 
offender,” she declared that “principles and practice reject pigeonhole 
approaches and favour a disposition that is sensitive to all the circumstances 
of every individual case.”216 And in R. v. Latimer, the Court emphasized 
the fault element in explaining why life imprisonment for second degree 
murder does not violate section 12.217 
The relationship between fault and punishment in this jurisprudence 
has been recognized and discussed by Kent Roach, who is critical of the 
Supreme Court’s propensity to cite the presence of a fault requirement 
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— as required by section 7 — to support the conclusion that mandatory 
punishments do not violate section 12.218 Yet his critique does not reject 
fault as one of the variables in the proportionality analysis. To the contrary, 
Roach supports individualized fault as the benchmark against which the 
proportionality of punishment should be measured under this guarantee. 
The difficulty, from his point of view, is that the Court has relied on the 
presence of a fault element to uphold mandatory sentences. Not only is 
fault an abstract rather than individualized concept under this approach, 
but the presence of a fault element has been relied upon to make it 
virtually impossible to show disproportionality under section 12. 
Section 7 and section 12 each have their own problems. The conclusion 
reached in earlier sections of the paper, that the Court’s conception of 
section 7 is irreparably incoherent, led to the proposal that the jurisprudence 
return to a procedural interpretation of the guarantee. It does not follow, 
though, that the Charter should no longer play a role in reviewing the 
criminal law. The goal of this discussion has been to consider whether 
the relationship between fault and punishment can be decided, in future 
cases, under section 12. In other words, the question is whether the 
minimum mens rea cases can be restated as a principle that section 12’s 
requirement of proportionality will be violated when the fault element is 
too attenuated to support the sentence imposed. 
The difficulty is that, at best, section 12 is little more than a faint hope 
guarantee. Whether read conjunctively, disjunctively or compendiously, the 
references to “cruel” and “unusual” invoke memories of a bygone era 
when physical barbarity and extreme forms of corporal punishment were 
part of the criminal law’s artillery. Perhaps swayed by the text and 
history of a guarantee that suggested a narrow focus, the Court has 
given section 12 an interpretation which has crippled the entitlement. 
The meaning of cruel and unusual should not be stuck in that history, 
but should be determined — afresh — by section 12’s underlying values. 
Instead of taking that approach, the gross disproportionality test has 
displaced a concept of proportionality which would examine the 
relationship between the blameworthiness of the accused and the prescribed 
punishment. It is particularly troubling, in this regard, that the Court’s 
response to mandatory minimums takes decontextualization to new heights 
by consistently upholding measures which impose punishment on the 
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basis of a statutory abstraction, and without reference to the circumstances 
of the offender. Under the current standard, the threshold for breach is 
so high as to be insurmountable. 
This paper has explored the Court’s conception of section 7 in the 
first 25 years of the Charter, and examined alternatives to a substantive 
interpretation of the guarantee. In terms of the substantive criminal law, 
a minimum mens rea has been section 7’s primary contribution to  
the Charter jurisprudence. The foundational cases — the MVR,219 
Vaillancourt220 and Martineau221 — stand for the proposition that certain 
punishments cannot be imposed in the absence of a constitutionally 
required fault element. Section 12 can support the same conclusion 
because both guarantees are concerned with the relationship between 
fault and punishment; while section 7 has been more immediately 
concerned with the sufficiency of the fault requirement, section 12 is 
directed, in terms, to take the measure of the punishment. Whether the 
fault is sufficient depends on the punishment which follows upon 
conviction, and whether the punishment is permissible depends on 
whether the sentence is proportionate to the accused’s blameworthiness. 
The Charter’s prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment is the preferred venue for claims which consider whether 
there is a relationship of proportionality between fault and punishment. 
The problem arises where the fault element is too attenuated in relation 
to the punishment that attaches to conviction. In circumstances of 
imprisonment without fault or a mandatory prison term which is not 
calibrated according to the accused’s fault, the punishment was 
impermissible under section 7. It would and should be unconstitutional, for 
the same reasons, under section 12. Shifting that aspect of proportionality to 
the punishment guarantee would retain a role for the Charter and the 
criminal law. In doing so, the shift would provide a focus and a context 
which has been lacking under section 7, but will direct the section 12 
jurisprudence and at the same time avoid the problems spawned by the 
MVR.222 The section 7 jurisprudence demonstrates that the scope for a 
minimum mens rea is and should be narrow; otherwise, as the Court 
discovered, the judges faced the prospect of substituting their concept of 
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fault for that chosen by Parliament. Still, and despite the importance of 
setting boundaries around the Court’s authority to review criminal law 
policy, those which are currently in place under section 12 are too 
restrictive. A more extensive discussion of the guarantee must be deferred 
to another time and place; the point for present purposes is that section 
12 can stand in for section 7 in cases which test the proportionality 
between fault and punishment in the criminal law. 
Ending substantive review under section 7 would bring conceptual 
clarity back into the section 7 jurisprudence. Some claims would be lost 
under a procedural interpretation of the guarantee and others would 
survive, but be redirected to other provisions of the Charter.223 In this 
way the problems associated with a substantive interpretation of section 7 
will be avoided, without abandoning Charter review of the criminal law. 
There is no need, in cases of overlap between sections 7 and 8, to 
duplicate the analysis and find a violation under both guarantees. 224 
Likewise, the cases which challenged bail provisions should be tested 
under section 11(e) and not under section 7.225 By the same token, 
decisions dealing with the presumption of innocence should be decided 
under that provision, and not under section 7.226 Nor, in discussing the 
criminal law, can other guarantees outside the framework for legal rights 
— such as the fundamental freedom and section 15 — be forgotten. 
Finally, claims which test the relationship between fault and punishment 
should be addressed by section 12. What will remain is section 7’s vital 
purpose — as the source of additional procedural entitlements in the 
justice system — such as full answer and defence.227 That, in brief 
outline, is what the Charter could look like if the Court were to adopt a 
procedural conception of section 7. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Early in the Charter’s history, the late Antonio Lamer proposed a 
concept of section 7 which had the potential for significant impact on 
the substantive criminal law. This view of section 7 and of the Charter’s 
interaction with the criminal law made headway in an important trio of 
cases, and then faltered. Justice Lamer’s approach, which reserved a 
substantive interpretation of the guarantee for the institutions of justice, 
failed to hold the Court’s support over time: its selective focus on the 
justice system proved unworkable and — in the larger scheme of questions 
about what is or is not unjust — idiosyncratic as well. Decision by 
decision, the Court skirted around the MVR’s228 institutional constraint 
until little is left, today, of Lamer J.’s core assumptions: that justice and 
policy are readily separable, and that the legitimacy of review is 
unassailable, but only when the substantive content of the guarantee is 
limited to the justice system. 
These dynamics lead to a conclusion that it was unwise for the 
Court to grant section 7 a substantive interpretation in the MVR.229 With 
only a few decisions that enforce a substantive concept of fundamental 
justice in the criminal law, and no clear authority for substantive social 
or economic entitlements under the guarantee, it is not too late to reverse 
course and return to what the drafters intended, which is an entitlement 
of procedural scope and content. Within the criminal law, that approach 
would leave the existing section 7 jurisprudence on procedural entitlements 
untouched and shift other claims to the Charter’s issue-specific legal rights 
guarantees. After the changes two gaps would still remain; a remedy 
would no longer be available under section 7 for injustices in the sphere 
of social and economic policy, nor would the guarantee entertain claims 
that the criminal law is substantively unfair. As has been argued throughout 
the paper, neither is an appropriate subject of review under section 7. To 
the extent a remedy is required, it must be sought and found under other 
Charter guarantees. 
Justice Lamer’s fault trilogy spotted and addressed a proportionality 
gap between fault and punishment in the substantive criminal law. Though 
the Court must exercise caution when reviewing Parliament’s criminal 
law policy, some provisions invite intervention, and a disparity between 
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an offender’s blameworthiness and the sentence imposed is one of them. 
For that reason, this paper does not suggest that the fault trio was 
incorrectly decided; its position, instead, is that the section 7 cases 
rested on a question of proportionality which could and should have 
been addressed under section 12. In other words, a disproportionate 
relationship between fault and punishment should be an ongoing concern 
of the Charter’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. For 
that to happen, the section 12 jurisprudence must be released from the 
constraints of the gross disproportionality test, which has made it next to 
impossible for challenges to mandatory minimums and other departures 
from individualized justice to succeed. 
The task of reforming the standard of breach for section 12 remains, 
but is deferred for now. The first step, in developing a coherent relationship 
between the Charter and the criminal law, is to return section 7 to its 
original conception and shift substantive issues about the proportionality 
of fault and punishment to section 12. Such a step would preserve the 
validity of the section 7 fault trio, retain a place for substantive review of a 
more focused nature under section 12 of the Charter, and fundamentally 
alter the scope and function of section 7. 
 
